

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 July 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO

(Brazil)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
Mr. A.F. DUMONT
Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Mr. M.E. DELPECH

Brazil:

Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. T. PETROV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGATIEFF
Mr. R.W. CLARK
Mr. R.E. MOORE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. F. MARESKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. G. ALEMU

Hungary:

Mr. J. PETRAN
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. F.L. OTTLERI
Mr. B. BORSARELLI
Mr. U. FESTALOZZA

Japan:

Mr. H. TANAKA
Mr. H. OTSUKA
Mr. T. SENGOKU
Mr. J. SAKAMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. B. SEPULVEDA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. Z. ERENDO

Morocco:

Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI

Netherlands:

Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. C.O. HOLLIST

Pakistan:

Mr. K. AHMED

Poland:

Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. N. CHILIE

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE

United Arab Republic:

Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. ISMAIL

United Kingdom:

Lord LOTHIAN
Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
Mr. C.H. GODDEN

United States of America:

Mr. J.F. LEONARD
Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
Mr. W. GIVAN
Mr. R.L. McCORMACK

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
Mr. M. VUKOVIC

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): I declare open the 482nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
2. It is my pleasure and honour to welcome here the new leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Lothian.
3. Lord LOTHIAN (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words of welcome to me.
4. I should like to begin by expressing my pleasure and satisfaction at making my first visit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament after assuming responsibility for arms-control and disarmament matters in the new United Kingdom Government, and taking over as leader of the United Kingdom delegation. I consider it a great honour; and I look forward to the prospect of working with the other members of the Committee in the formidable but worthwhile task with which the international community has entrusted us. There is no need for me to stress the heavy responsibility involved in our work and the expectations with which the peoples of the world, and particularly the young people, look to us for a lead in the search for a more secure and peaceful world. The Secretary-General of the United Nations reminded us when he spoke in Geneva on 6 July (Press Release ECOSOC/378) of the vast sums of money being spent on armaments. We can all think of many better ways in which those resources could be spent to improve the quality of life for our peoples and reduce the gap between the rich and the poor nations. Our task is therefore of the greatest importance.
5. I should like to take the opportunity of this my first speech in the Committee to explain in general terms the United Kingdom's approach to arms control and disarmament under the new Government. My Government intends to continue to play an active and constructive role in this Committee's work. Our aim now, as in the past, is agreement on realistic and practical measures, both of arms control and of disarmament — for, despite the Committee's title, we believe that we cannot confine our attention to disarmament in the strict sense of the reduction of arms but must accord due and full weight to the control of armaments as well. Indeed, we see arms-control and disarmament measures as having the common over-all objective of improving security for all, at, if possible, a lower economic cost.
6. My Government shares with other Governments represented here the desire to reach an ultimate state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in a peaceful world. But we are not going to bring that about overnight. It will inevitably be a slow process, and we must meanwhile consider all possible steps,

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however limited they may at first sight appear, which could take us in the right direction. At this point it would perhaps be appropriate for me to say a word about the request put to this Committee in United Nations General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275) to work out a comprehensive programme for disarmament. I hope it will be possible to mark this, the first year of the Disarmament Decade, by agreeing the contents of a programme for our future work. But I believe it is essential that we should take a practical and down-to-earth approach to our work in this Committee, and avoid setting rigid time-tables. The best course is to concentrate our attention on the steps that are most urgently needed and most clearly within reach.

7. The Committee has increasingly come to concern itself with the hard facts of national security interests and, I believe, with the convergence rather than the divergence of those interests. I feel sure that this development can only improve the effectiveness of the Committee as a negotiating body.

8. A prime achievement of the Geneva disarmament negotiations in recent years has been the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). As one of the depositary Powers for the Treaty, the United Kingdom Government feels a special concern for its progress. Brought into force on 5 March, the Treaty has been ratified by fifty-four States; but there are still difficulties to overcome in the implementation of the Treaty on a world-wide basis. The forty-two signatory States which have not yet ratified it, and the thirty States which have not even signed it, must be encouraged to become parties to the Treaty; for without the full participation of the near-nuclear States the Treaty risks becoming an empty document. For that reason we welcome the establishment of a Safeguards Committee within the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the efforts that the Committee is making to formulate the contents of safeguards agreements required in connexion with the Treaty. Only by thorough examination of the problems connected with safeguards, and by dispelling the suspicions in some countries that the Treaty discriminates against them, can we convince those countries that the Treaty, by preventing the diversion of resources to nuclear weapons, will promote peaceful nuclear activities throughout the world.

9. An essential complementary need, of course, is to demonstrate that the nuclear-weapon States are themselves carrying out their obligation under article VI of the Treaty to undertake negotiations in good faith to put an end to the nuclear arms race. It is only realistic to recognize that a very special responsibility in this connexion rests with the United States and the Soviet Union. Progress in nuclear disarmament must initially depend on bilateral understanding between those countries. We are therefore encouraged by the signs of progress in the strategic arms limitation talks

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(SALT) in Vienna. The confidential nature of the talks, and the absence of propaganda, must surely indicate that we can look forward to a positive result.

10. I am sure that we all recognize the great problems that face the super-Powers. But, while it would be wrong to expect rapid agreement, we have no doubt that these talks offer the best hopes of limiting the nuclear arms race and opening the way for further progress in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. The successful outcome of these talks would mark a most significant advance in building international confidence and provide a new impetus to our continuing work here in Geneva. If indeed SALT should become a continuing negotiation, we would then have two bodies, one bilateral and the other multilateral, whose work could complement each other fruitfully in the arms-control field.

11. I should like to say a few words now about the co-Chairmen's revised draft sea-bed treaty (CCD/269/Rev.2). My Government welcomes the draft and endorses the aim of banning nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the sea-bed beyond a twelve-mile coastal zone. The present draft takes into account the views of many delegations and has evolved from a long process of constructive and thoughtful debate both here in the Committee and in the United Nations General Assembly. As we have heard in the course of this session, the draft does not satisfy all delegations. My delegation too has suggested some changes which we still think would improve the draft. I would accordingly ask the co-Chairmen to look at them carefully when they come to consider a final draft.

12. We believe, however, that all the main elements of a thoroughly worthwhile and timely agreement are now present in the draft. We consider that the reference in the third paragraph of the preamble to further negotiations towards the exclusion of the sea-bed from the arms race is an adequate reminder of the goal to which we all aspire, particularly when it is taken together with the provisions of article VI for a review conference. As to other points which have been raised by delegations this session, my Government too would welcome a reference in article III to international good offices, if an appropriate and widely-acceptable formulation can be found.

13. With respect to the law-of-the-sea questions to which a number of delegations have referred I should make it clear that, where the effect of suggestions made in this Committee is to clarify the meaning of the text, they have our full support. Our underlying attitude, however, is that, where the draft treaty may be held to touch on law-of-the-sea questions, the wording should be as uncontentious as possible so as not to

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prejudge issues that may have to be dealt with in another forum. I hope that with good sense and good will a widely acceptable text can go forward to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

14. Turning now to the question of chemical and biological warfare, I should like first to pledge my determination to work for the strengthening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI), the forty-fifth anniversary of which we celebrate this year. My Government regards that Protocol as the cornerstone of all our efforts in the field of chemical and biological warfare.

15. In our view that end can best be served by continuing to work towards a convention banning the production, possession and use of biological methods of warfare on the basis of the draft (ENDC/255/Rev.1) presented here by the United Kingdom delegation last year. I would strongly commend that convention to the Committee as a practical and realistic measure of arms control and disarmament. With the specific inclusion of toxins, which we accepted formally on 16 July (CCD/PV.479, paras. 12 et seq.), it represents a viable basis for an agreement which lies within our grasp now, dealing, as it does, in a comprehensive manner with a clear and self-contained category of weapons and agents. Such a soundly-based agreement could only serve to strengthen the Geneva Protocol and prepare the way for further measures in the field of chemical and biological warfare.

16. Looking ahead towards those further measures, we recognize the difficulties and problems to be faced in reaching an agreement to deal with chemical warfare; but, as my predecessor Lord Chalfont made quite clear, we shall not turn back from the task. However, I am bound to say that in my view the length of the path we have to tread towards measures to deal with chemical warfare presents no logical reason for a delay in seizing the opportunity of reaching agreement on biological methods of warfare until such time as we are sufficiently far advanced to be able to deal with chemical weapons at the same time.

17. It was in the time of a previous Conservative Government that another major advance took place in the arms-control field — the conclusion of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1). The negotiations of an adequately-verified comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and the cessation of all nuclear test explosions for weapons purposes in all environments and by all countries remains high among the aims of the present United Kingdom Government. We recognize, however, that further progress towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty depends to a considerable extent on the kind of agreement which might emerge from the strategic arms limitation talks.

18. In the meantime, however, there is valuable work to be done in our Committee in considering the form that a possible treaty might take and in further discussion of the

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complex problems of verification. Here I might perhaps remind the Committee of the 1968 United Kingdom proposal (ENDC/232) for an agreement on a quota of nuclear tests on a descending scale, which although a secondary measure could, we feel, be a very useful one. It could be of particular value in a situation in which agreement on a comprehensive test ban had been reached in principle but the super-Powers were not yet ready to accept the immediate suspension of all tests.

19. But the difficult problems of seismic detection and identification remain; and my country, among others, continues to work on these. In that context our Canadian colleagues recently put forward a helpful suggestion for exchange of seismic information (CCD/PV.473, paras. 25 et seq.) which might assist countries to gain increased access to data from existing systems. I should like also to draw attention to the working paper (ENDC/258) circulated by the United Kingdom in this Committee last August, in which the work of United Kingdom scientists was described. That paper reached the conclusion that the next step might be a detailed study of the ways and means of deploying an operational system based on new techniques in order to achieve the enhanced identification capability predicted in the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Seismic Study Group in 1968.

20. There is increasing interest in the international exchange of seismic data as an aid to verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Replies to the Secretary-General's enquiry called for in General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV) (CCD/275) will enable a comprehensive review to be made of the present status of seismic monitoring of underground nuclear events. In the meantime, as a contribution to such a review the scientists of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority have carried out a study aimed at determining what detection and identification capability could now be achieved in support of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, at what cost and on what time-scale. Their work is embodied in a working paper (CCD/296) which I have pleasure in laying before the Committee today. That study has not attempted, of course, to take into account the replies to the Secretary-General's enquiry. The paper is an attempt to demonstrate on an illustrative basis how the SIPRI prediction might be realized in practice. It is a practical study: every technique described in it is one which we know to be possible; and we have not drawn upon research and development techniques which are not yet proven. I believe that this paper, together with its glossary of seismic terms in the context of the test ban, will help to give purpose to our discussions on this almost intractable problem.

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21. In conclusion, may I recall that no part of what we are discussing here can be isolated from events elsewhere? Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of national and international security and of all our defence and political thinking. The prospects for strengthening international peace and security look more hopeful now than they have for some time; and the work of this Committee and the mutual confidence established here in the 1960s have played their part in that brighter prospect. I look forward to contributing to the negotiation in the Committee of agreements which will effectively improve world security in the years ahead.

22. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I should like to join you in welcoming the new leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Lothian.

23. In our statement today we should like to deal with several aspects of verification of the prohibition of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It seems to us, indeed, that in the consideration of that problem the question of verification is the focus of the attention of some delegations; not only because, like every disarmament measure, it is of primary significance, but also because some delegations are trying to use it as a smoke-screen for their political approach to the problem as a whole. We have witnessed some delegations attempting, on the question of verification: first, to prove that biological and bacteriological weapons should be dealt with as two separate problems; second, to prove that it is necessary, before the concrete provisions of any convention can be discussed, to examine thoroughly all the technical aspects of the problem — that is, to transfer the problem to a purely technical sphere with as much scientific and unpolitical argumentation as possible; and third, to use it as an argument for delaying the solution proposed at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by the delegations of the socialist countries in their draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655), which provides simple but highly effective measures for the speedy achievement of a complete prohibition.

24. In examining the whole problem we have proceeded from the fact that verification of the prohibition of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons might be applied in three different situations: first, as a general control over commercial production and research with the aim of ascertaining that these are not

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used for military purposes — that is, verification, so to speak, in a normal situation; secondly, in a case where a State suspected violation of the ban by some other State; and thirdly, in a case where a State lodged a complaint that chemical and bacteriological weapons had been used against it.

25. Let us now examine the possibilities of control in those three cases. First, there is the so-called ordinary, normal situation. Let us take bacteriological weapons first. It is known that bacteriological weapons intended to have a local effect do not require any special equipment for their production. It is possible to prepare ad hoc small quantities of a virulent culture in any microbiological laboratory, and to fill ampoules or other vessels with it. The quantity of the culture, or bacterial suspension, would amount to only a few litres. The selection of germs could be limited to bacteria, especially those causing intestinal infections -- abdominal typhus, dysentery, cholera --, anthrax, plague and some others, which could be used for the contamination of places with greater concentrations of people and would do very great harm.

26. It can be said that in a normal situation the control by outside means of bacteriological weapons during their production and research is very difficult, as it is impossible to watch every small laboratory; yet such a laboratory would be able to develop and produce bacteriological weapons in sufficient quantities without any great difficulty. As we have already stated many times in this Committee, there is no need for mass production of bacteriological weapons; nevertheless a large number of institutions and factories could be producing them.

27. In this respect what is the situation with chemical weapons? If we want to form a clear picture of the enormous scale of production of chemical materials designed for peaceful purposes which at the same time could be quite easily used for military purposes, we can proceed from the United States working paper of 16 March, from which I should like to recall briefly the following:

"In the fifty years since the end of World War I, for example, gross production of the worldwide chemical industry has increased in value from an estimated \$5 billion to \$150 billion, approximately a thirty-fold increase. ...

"The everyday production of commercial materials relevant to chemical warfare in the United States, as in other industrially developed countries, is quite substantial. For example, there are nineteen locations for phosgene production and eleven facilities for hydrogen cyanide production in the United States. These produce in total approximately 350,000 tons of phosgene and 200,000 tons of hydrogen cyanide per year for commercial purposes. ...

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"Elsewhere in the world, there are at least fifty plants involved in the production or formulation, or both, of commercial organophosphorus pesticides in a total of twelve countries, including countries of Western and Eastern Europe. The total world output of the entire organophosphorus pesticide industry is estimated to be in excess of 130,000 tons annually."

(CCD/283)

These, as the document of the United States says, can be used for the production of nerve agents in chemical warfare.

28. From those citations we can see what an enormous quantity of production for peaceful purposes would have to be covered by such a control. And what kind of control, then, should or could be used? Let us look at page 3 of the working paper of Sweden of 30 April (CCD/287). All methods of control so far known and used are listed there in a clear and lucid manner. The first method of verification is called "Collection of information". But what kind of procedure would be needed for the enormous quantity and volume of production of chemical materials? And what kind of procedure should be applied to cover the huge number of laboratories able to produce bacteriological weapons? And, at the same time, who would guarantee that all information collected in this way would really cover everything?

29. Something about this method has been disclosed in the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The reference is mainly to bacteriological weapons; but it is more or less evident that a similar verification procedure could also be applied in certain circumstances in the case of chemical weapons. The report indicates the incalculable amount of information which individual plants should provide in various questionnaires, including information such as personnel data which would require to be renewed continuously. What machinery would each plant need in order to answer such questionnaires? And what machinery would be needed for the evaluation on an international basis of all the information supplied? And where is the guarantee that all data acquired in this way would really be correct?

30. The United States working paper of 16 July (CCD/293) shows that in the field of chemical weapons so-called off-site inspections are impossible. The same, I am sure, applies to bacteriological weapons. Does that, however, mean that on-site inspection would be more successful? That method of verification raises the well-known problem on which a number of disarmament agreements have already failed. It is evident that regular international supervision of the kind of huge production described in the United States working paper (CCD/283) is not feasible. Similarly, as we have already

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said, it would be impossible to carry out regular on-site international supervision of every small laboratory. There is no way of securing that this method of verification would really cover everything and not become a mere formality or something else, something even worse.

31. Therefore it now remains to give an answer as to what kind of verification would be practicable in these cases. The Swedish working paper which I have already mentioned lists as the fifth possible method of verification "National self-supervision and inspection". The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, submitted by the socialist countries, contains the obligation upon States parties to adopt the necessary legislative and administrative measures in order to comply with the prohibition. In this respect an interesting suggestion is contained in the SIPRI report, Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Part IV, Verification, where on page 49 the possibility is dealt with of using for the purposes of verification, by national means, a national body having an international reputation, such as the Academy of Sciences. The SIPRI report refers to verification in a different context; but we are nevertheless of the opinion that this suggestion is also relevant to our case.

32. Then there is the question of verification in cases where a State might suspect some other State of not complying with the agreement. To cover such a case the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland have proposed a solution in their working paper of 14 April (CCD/285). As is known, that document suggests that a State which has reasonable doubts about the fulfilment by another State of its obligations may request the Security Council to investigate the case and take all necessary measures. However, before doing that a State party to the treaty having reasonable doubts regarding the fulfilment of its obligations by another State party might consult with other States parties to the treaty in order to clarify the situation. The representative of Japan rightly reminded the Committee of that possibility in his statement of 14 July (CCD/PV.478, para. 69). Just as we believe that mutual trust among nations will grow, we believe that the importance of this kind of verification will grow.

33. Where consultations did not clarify the situation, or if some State party to the treaty refused to co-operate in consultations, then, of course, it would be the task of the Security Council to do whatever might be possible in order to clarify the situation and to save the treaty. It is indeed highly probable that a State party to such a

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treaty which continued to have reasonable doubts that another State was or other States were fulfilling their obligations would cease to be a party to the treaty, and the whole treaty might collapse. It would, however, be necessary for the Security Council to determine its concrete procedure for such cases; and in our view there are a number of possibilities, including that contained in the working paper of Sweden concerning the various methods of verification under item 2, Inquiry, and other possibilities. However, it would be the duty of the Security Council to verify in practice the observance of the resolution which would certainly be adopted in that connexion and to decide upon the most effective ways of doing so.

34. Finally there is the question of control in the case where a State might suspect that bacteriological or chemical weapons had been used against it. Even if there are limited possibilities for the clandestine use of some kinds of chemical weapons -- for instance, in order to destroy crops, and so on -- chemical weapons could hardly be used otherwise than in a conflict. If someone had doubts as to whether an agent of warfare had really been used in a limited conflict, it would not be too difficult to submit the necessary evidence, such as medical inspection of affected persons, and so on.

35. As is known, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) does not deal with the question of verification in the case of non-compliance. The best guarantees of compliance with the Protocol were in fact the reservations made by individual countries at the time of signing, from which it is clear that a violation of the Protocol by one party would result in retaliation with the same means by the other party.

36. In the case of a breach of the agreement we are now considering, the Security Council of the United Nations would have to deal with it either on the basis of a complaint or on the basis of its own functions emanating from Article 24 of the Charter. As far as the possibility of retaliation is concerned, we can well imagine that that would always be open, and by other means as well.

37. The situation is somewhat different in the case of biological weapons. They can be used not only in the case of a conflict but also in a clandestine way, in order to weaken the opponent's strength, to reduce the possibility of resistance, to stir up disturbances, and so on. In such cases the Security Council would choose the most suitable form of investigation in order to ascertain that biological weapons had really been used; and, according to the result of such investigation, it would decide upon proper counter-measures.

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38. In conclusion we should like to return to the three points we spoke of at the beginning of this statement. We are of the opinion that if we consider the whole question of verification without any ulterior motives, and especially if we avoid any attempts to justify the lack of willingness to reach a necessary political solution by the difficulties connected with the question of verification, we can state that the questions connected with verification show, first, that chemical and bacteriological weapons are closely connected, among other things by the common problems of their control; second, that a purely technical discussion may serve only as a smoke-screen to cover up the intention to delay a decision; and, third, that a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, as proposed by the socialist countries at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, could be concluded without delay, since sufficient means exist to ensure its observance.

39. Mr. KHATTABI (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I also should like to welcome to our midst Lord Lothian, the new leader of the United Kingdom delegation, who has just delivered a brilliant maiden speech to the Conference. We wish him the greatest success in the mission entrusted to him by his Government.

40. Approaching the thorny problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, Mr. Benhima pointed out at our meeting of 21 April that, even if the technical, military and other distinctions between the two categories of weapons, biological and chemical, are recognized,

"... the certain conclusions of such an analysis do not seem to outweigh the advantages of a prohibition of the two categories of weapons simultaneously and the incorporation of that prohibition in a single text." (CCD/FV.466, para. 14)

That comment, which summarizes the preliminary point of view of the Moroccan delegation on chemical and biological weapons, is by no means intended to disregard the difficult problem of defining a system of verification capable of ensuring that the provisions of an agreement prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons shall be respected and observed.

41. In view of the importance which my delegation attaches to this vital and urgent question, I have the honour to submit to the Conference today a working paper (CCD/295) based on the outline given by the leader of my delegation on 21 April (CCD/FV.466, paras. 19-23). This document, the object of which is to help simultaneously to

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reconcile ideas expressed in the Conference and to search for a way out of our impasse, also takes into account resolution 2603 B (XXIV) of the United Nations General Assembly, which requests our Conference —

"... to give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on the prohibitions and other measures referred to in the draft conventions [submitted to the Conference] and other relevant proposals" (CCD/275).

42. While we recognize the important and decisive role of political will in the total elimination of chemical and biological weapons, we have to observe that the international situation and the relations between the great Powers possessing or able to make such weapons are not often such as to promote that mutual confidence which is an essential and indispensable component of political good will. Furthermore, the mutual fear generated by the existence of arsenals of chemical and biological weapons is bound to encourage their proliferation and consequently increase the danger of their use for destructive ends.

43. To promote and strengthen mutual confidence among States it is necessary and urgent to adopt a certain number of international disarmament measures. Thus it is of the greatest importance to conclude an international agreement under which all States parties would undertake the contractual and solemn obligation no longer to develop, manufacture or stockpile chemical or biological weapons, and to destroy existing stocks of these. The salutary effect of such an undertaking both upon international opinion and upon relations between States can easily be imagined.

44. Paragraph 1 of our working paper proposes that the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons, including toxins, should be jointly prohibited by one principal legal instrument which would also provide for their destruction. The draft convention submitted last year to the United Nations General Assembly by nine socialist countries (A/7655) with the amendment submitted by Hungary, Mongolia and Poland (CCD/285), and the draft convention of the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1) amended at the suggestion of the United States delegation (CCD/290), appear to contain the main points of this prohibition.

45. To guarantee that the provisions of that agreement are respected and observed, we consider that verification and control procedures might be dealt with separately for biological agents and toxins — whose immediate elimination does not raise any major difficulty — and for chemical agents, whose complexity makes it difficult at present,

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in the view of certain delegations, to have a control that would inspire confidence in the observance of the provisions prohibiting these agents if designed for military use. Therefore, according to our working paper, we must provide in the principal instrument means for the consideration of problems concerning procedures of verification for the prohibition of chemical weapons. That instrument should, of course, set a time-limit for the drafting of a supplementary document which would definitively lay down the verification procedures for this category of weapons. The convening of a meeting of experts, proposed last year by the Japanese delegation (ENDC/PV.428, para. 47), would in our view certainly be useful particularly to consider the technical aspects of verification relating to chemical weapons.

46. The relation between the industrial and commercial production of chemical agents for civilian purposes and the manufacture of chemical weapons is an important aspect of the problem which should be examined and settled. That problem has already been the subject of a number of working papers and of relevant and constructive comments.

47. In that connexion I should like to emphasize that military reasons should not prevent us from dealing with these two categories of weapons together and enacting their prohibition in a single instrument. It should be made clear, consequently, that the technical aspects of the problem of verification of chemical agents are, in our view, the only ones that should be considered to justify the preparation of a text that could be appended, according to our working paper, to the basic instrument designed completely to eliminate chemical and biological weapons.

48. Before concluding, I should like to express my delegation's gratitude to all those who have helped our work forward by presenting working papers or suggestions on this question. In that connexion we listened with the keenest interest to the remarkable statement made on 21 July by Mrs. Myrdal, the Swedish representative (CCD/PV.480), who clearly described the main features of an agreement combining the advantages of the two draft conventions before us and at the same time providing valuable material for a completer and more broadly acceptable agreement. We consider that the analysis she then made deserves the closest consideration by this Committee. We sincerely hope that the efforts of the members of this Committee will enable us to accomplish the important task entrusted to us by the United Nations General Assembly.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 482nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Ramiro E. Saraiva Guerreiro, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia and Morocco.

"The delegation of Morocco submitted a working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (CCD/295).

"The delegation of the United Kingdom submitted a working paper on the verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CCD/296).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 30 July 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.